

Autocrats and their Business Allies: The Informal
Politics of Defection and Co-optation

Supplementary Material

Government & Opposition

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Appendix A: Model Proofs

Assume b_c expresses the threshold where B is indifferent between yielding and challenging, given that he opposed and D doubled down. Let b_o express the threshold where B is indifferent between yielding and opposing D . Let d_d denote the threshold by which D is indifferent between doubling down and yielding, given that B has opposed.

Let $\theta_b = F_d(d_d)$ denote B 's prior belief that D will double down given his opposition. Define θ_d as D 's posterior belief that B will escalate after he doubles down following B 's opposition. Note that θ_d can be expressed as $\theta_d = \frac{F_b(b_c)}{F_b(b_o)}$.

Complete information ■ D and B observe each other's payoffs under complete information, and the game is solved for r_b and r_d using backward induction. At the final decision node, B will mount a challenge if

$$r_b \leq \frac{1+k}{c} \equiv b_c \quad (\text{A1})$$

If equation A1 holds, D will double down if

$$r_d \leq \frac{k+p}{c} \equiv d_d \quad (\text{A2})$$

Note that D will always double down if $p \geq c$. If equation A1 does not hold, then D will always double down, given $k+p > -k-p$; therefore B will always choose to yield in the beginning, as $-1-k < -1$. If equation A1 holds but equation A2 does not, then B will oppose knowing that D will yield. If equation A1 and A2 both hold, then B will escalate and challenge D if

$$r_b \leq \frac{1}{c} \equiv b_o \quad (\text{A3})$$

The equilibrium strategies under complete information are as follows:

$$S_b = \begin{cases} \{Yield, Yield\} & \text{if } r_b > \frac{1+k}{c} \\ \{Oppose, Challenge\} & \text{if } r_b \leq \frac{1}{c} \\ \{Yield, Challenge\} & \text{if } \frac{1}{c} < r_b \leq \frac{1+k}{c} \end{cases} \quad S_d = \begin{cases} \{Yield\} & \text{if } r_d > \frac{k+p}{c} \\ \{Double Down\} & \text{if } r_d \leq \frac{k+p}{c} \end{cases} \quad (\text{A4})$$

Predictions ■ There are three possible subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes: 1) B yields immediately and accepts the fiscal burden of the crisis, given the higher cost of escalation. 2) Anticipating the higher cost of B 's challenge, D yields to B 's opposition. 3) D doubles down and B mounts a challenge, leading to open confrontation. Figure A1 visualizes

these outcomes for $p > 1$.




Figure A1: Outcomes under complete information

of cooptation. Note that P_{d_d} is always larger than P_{b_o} : D 's likelihood of repression is always higher than B 's opposition. Figure A2 illustrates the relationship between the degree of cooptation and the likelihood of D 's repression and B 's opposition.




Figure A2: The likelihood of repression for different values of p and c , and $k = 0.5$. The shaded region shows the cumulative probability of B 's opposition.

Incomplete information ■ The solution concept for the game is PBE. The equilibrium strategies are solved for r_b and r_d and their beliefs over each other's strategies. U_b refers to B 's utility, and U_d D 's.

Next, I present the following equilibrium strategies.

$P_{b_o}(r_b \leq \frac{1}{c})$ indicates the cumulative probability of B 's opposition to D . $P_{d_d}(r_d \leq \frac{k+p}{c})$ expresses the cumulative probability of D doubling down with the threat of repression conditional on the opposition. $P_{b_c}(r_b \leq \frac{1+k}{c})$ denotes the cumulative probability of B 's challenge conditional on repression. The comparative statistics suggest that, first, the more politically connected B is to D , the less likely he will mount a challenge. The higher the cost of repression, the less likely B is to defy D . If B prefers opposition, D 's decision of repression depends on the relative net benefit of rent extraction and public popularity compared to B 's degree

Proposition A1 ■ *The following strategies present a PBE:*

When $F_d(d_d) \neq 0$ and $b_o > 0$ and $F_b(b_c) \leq \frac{2F_b(b_o)(k+p)}{r_dc+k+p}$ and $F_d(d_d) \leq \frac{1}{(1+k)}$,

$S_b = \{Oppose, Challenge\}$ when $r_b \leq b_o$

$S_b = \{Oppose, Yield\}$ when $b_o \geq r_b > b_c$

$S_b = \{Yield, Yield\}$ when $r_b > b_c$

$S_d = \{Double Down\}$ when $r_d \leq d_d$

$S_d = \{Yield\}$ when $r_d > d_d$

Proof. B challenges the regime at the third and final decision node when $r_b \leq b_c$. Then D doubles down if

$$\mathbb{E}U_d(\text{Double down}) = \theta_d(-r_dc) + (1 - \theta_d)(k + p) \geq (-k - p) \quad (\text{A5})$$

Rearranged for θ_d :

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_d &\leq \frac{2(k+p)}{r_dc+k+p} \\ F_b(b_c) &\leq \frac{2F_b(b_o)(k+p)}{r_dc+k+p} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A6})$$

B will oppose the regime if:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}U_b(\text{Oppose} \mid r_b > \frac{1+k}{c}) &= F_d(d_d)(-1-k) \geq -1 \\ F_d(d_d) &\leq \frac{1}{(1+k)} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A7})$$

B will not deviate from the strategy with the following caveat:

$$F_d(d_d)(-1-k) < 0 \quad (\text{A8})$$

Note that we can derive b_o by comparing B 's expected utility from opposing and accepting the fiscal burden, ensuring that B 's strategy is sequentially rational and consistent, as requirements of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Solving inequality A5 for r_d :

$$\begin{aligned}
r_d &\leq \frac{2(k+p)}{\theta_d c} - \frac{(k+p)}{c} \equiv d_d \\
F_b(b_o) &= \frac{F_b(b_c)(d_d c + k + p)}{2(k+p)} \\
b_o &= F^{-1} \left[\frac{F_b(b_c)(d_d c + k + p)}{2(k+p)} \right] \\
b_o &= F^{-1} \left[\frac{F_b(b_c)(F^{-1}(d_d)c + k + p)}{2(k+p)} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{A9}$$

Proposition A2 ■ *The following strategies constitute a PBE:*

When $F_b(b_c) > \frac{2(k+p)}{r_d c + k + p}$ and $F_d(d_d) \neq 0$,

$$\begin{aligned}
S_b &= \{Oppose, Challenge\} \text{ when } r_b \leq b_o \\
S_b &= \{Oppose, Yield\} \text{ when } r_b > b_o \\
S_d &= \{Yield\}
\end{aligned}$$

Proof. At the third and final decision node, B mounts a challenge when $r_b \leq b_o$. Then D prefers yielding over doubling down with the following condition:

$$\theta_d(-r_d c) + (1 - \theta_d)(k + p) < (-k - p) \tag{A10}$$

Rearranged for θ_d :

$$\begin{aligned}
\theta_d &> \frac{2(k+p)}{r_d c + k + p} \\
F_b(b_c) &> \frac{2F_b(b_o)(k+p)}{r_d c + k + p}
\end{aligned} \tag{A11}$$

Because B always opposes, $F_b(b_o) = 1$. Then D yields when $F_b(b_c) > \frac{2(k+p)}{r_d c + k + p}$. Anticipating that D yields, B will always oppose, and not deviate from this strategy with the caveats that $F_d(d_d)(-1 - k) < 0$ and $\mathbb{E}U_b(\text{Oppose} | r_b > \frac{1+k}{pc}) = (1 - F_d(d_d))(0) \geq (-1)$, which is trivial.

Proposition A3 ■ *The following strategies characterize a PBE:*

When $F_b(b_c) \leq \frac{2F_b(b_o)(k+p)}{r_d c + k + p}$ and $F_d(d_d) \leq \frac{1}{b_o c}$ and $F_d(d_d) \neq 0$,

$$\begin{aligned}
S_b &= \{Oppose, Challenge\} \text{ when } r_b \leq b_o \\
S_b &= \{Yield, Yield\} \text{ when } r_b > b_o \\
S_d &= \{Double Down\} \text{ when } r_d \leq d_d \\
S_d &= \{Yield\} \text{ when } r_d > d_d
\end{aligned}$$

Proof. At the final decision node, B prefers challenging D when $r_b \leq b_c$. Then D doubles down when:

$$\mathbb{E}U_d(\text{Double down}) = \theta_d(-r_dc) + (1 - \theta_d)(k + p) \geq (-k - p) \quad (\text{A12})$$

Rearranged for θ_d :

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_d &\leq \frac{2(k + p)}{r_dc + k + p} \\ F_b(b_c) &\leq \frac{2F_b(b_o)(k + p)}{r_dc + k + p} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A13})$$

At the first node, the expected utility condition for B is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}U_b(\text{Oppose} \mid r_b < \frac{1 + k}{pc}) &= -F_d(d_d)(b_oc) \geq -1 \\ F_d(d_d) &\leq \frac{1}{b_oc} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A14})$$

B will not deviate from the strategy with the following caveat: $F_d(d_d)(-b_oc) < 0$, which is the case so long as $F_d(d_d) \neq 0$.

Predictions ■ Note the following thresholds:

$$b_c = \frac{1 + k}{c} \quad (\text{A15})$$

$$d_d = \frac{2b_o(k + p)}{b_cc} - \frac{k + p}{c}$$

The ex-ante probability that B will oppose:

$$b_o = \frac{b_c(d_dc + k + p)}{2(k + p)} \quad (\text{A16})$$

To be consistent with Proposition A1, set $d_d = \frac{1}{1+k}$. Then:

$$\begin{aligned} b_o &= \frac{\frac{1+k}{c}(\frac{c}{1+k} + k + p)}{2(k + p)} \\ b_o &= \frac{1 + (1 + k)(k + p)}{2c(k + p)} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A17})$$

Assume $k = 1$. Then $b_c = \frac{2}{c}$ and $d_d = \frac{1}{2}$. Consistent with Proposition A1, for $p = 1$, $b_o = \frac{5}{4c}$, and for $p = 2$, $b_o = \frac{7}{6c}$. For a lower level of fiscal cost for D , define $k = 0.2$. Then $b_c = \frac{1.2}{c}$ and $d_d = \frac{10}{12}$. Consistent with Proposition A1, for $p = 1$, $b_o = \frac{61}{60c}$, and for $p = 2$,

$b_o = \frac{36.4}{44c}$ (see Figure A6). Consistent with Proposition A1, D 's likelihood of repression could be independent of the degree of cooptation, too (see Figure A5).

Consistent with Proposition A3, let $d_d = \frac{1}{c}$. Assume $k = 1$. Then for $p = 1$, $b_o = \frac{3}{2c}$, and for $p = 2$, $b_o = \frac{4}{3c}$ (see Figure A3). For a lower cost for D , assume $k = 0.2$. Then for $p = 1$, $b_o = \frac{1.1}{c}$, and for $p = 2$, $b_o = \frac{0.87}{c}$ (Figure A4).




Figure A3: The likelihood of opposition for different values of p and c , and $k = 1$. The red line indicates the probability of D 's repression, consistent with Proposition A3.




Figure A4: The likelihood of opposition for different values of p and c , and $k = 0.2$. The red line indicates the probability of D 's repression, consistent with Proposition A3.




Figure A5: The likelihood of opposition for different values of p and c , and $k = 1$. The red line indicates the probability of D 's repression, consistent with Proposition A1.




Figure A6: The likelihood of opposition for different values of p and c , and $k = 0.2$. The red line indicates the probability of D 's repression, consistent with Proposition A1.

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Table B1: List of countries

Albania	Armenia	Bangladesh	Belarus
Benin	Bolivia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Burkina Faso
Burma/Myanmar	Burundi	Cambodia	Cameroon
Central African Rep.	Chad	Croatia	DRC
Dominican Rep.	Egypt	El Salvador	Ethiopia
Fiji	Georgia	Ghana	Guatemala
Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Guyana	Haiti
Honduras	Hungary	India	Indonesia
Ivory Coast	Jordan	Kenya	Kosovo
Kyrgyzstan	Lebanon	Lesotho	Liberia
Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania
Moldova	Montenegro	Morocco	Mozambique
Nepal	Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria
North Macedonia	Pakistan	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay
Peru	Philippines	Serbia	Sierra Leone
Slovakia	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan
Taiwan	Tanzania	Thailand	The Gambia
Togo	Tunisia	Turkey	Uganda
Ukraine	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe




Figure B1: The number of countries where the business elite opposes the regime. Source: V-DEM 2023.




Figure B2: The dark shaded regions show business elite in opposition. Light-blue coloured areas show electoral autocracy; otherwise white. Source: V-DEM 2023.




Figure B3: The number of countries where the business elite is part of the support coalition. Source: V-DEM 2023.




Figure B4: The dark shaded regions show business elite as support group. Light-blue coloured areas show electoral autocracy; otherwise white. Source: V-DEM 2023.




Figure B5: The dark-shaded regions show periods of crisis. Source: Nguyen, Castro, and Wood (2022).




Figure B6: Executive bribery and corruption measure with 95% CIs for 2019. Source: V-DEM 2023.

Table B2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Business opposition							
... 0	2102	0.85	0.36	0	1	1	1
... 1	2102	0.15	0.36	0	0	0	1
Business support							
... 0	2102	0.45	0.5	0	0	1	1
... 1	2102	0.55	0.5	0	0	1	1
Executive bribery	2114	0.78	1	-2.6	0.16	1.4	2.9
Neopatrimonialism	2114	0.59	0.21	0.12	0.43	0.77	0.97
Polarization	2114	0.32	1	-2.6	-0.48	0.98	4.2
Polyarchy	2114	0.45	0.18	0.087	0.3	0.56	0.86
Judicial constraints	2114	0.51	0.25	0.01	0.31	0.74	0.92
Support group size	2102	1	0.96	-2.5	0.44	1.7	2.9
Opposition group size	2102	0.58	1.1	-2.5	-0.15	1.4	3.1
Freedom from torture	2114	0.33	1.2	-3.2	-0.46	1.2	3
Freedom from killing	2114	0.64	1.3	-3	-0.4	1.5	3.2
State ownership	2114	0.77	0.8	-2.3	0.35	1.3	2.6
Pro-democracy mobilization	2114	0.39	1.1	-2.4	-0.31	1.1	4.4
Pro-autocracy mobilization	2114	-0.29	1.2	-2.2	-1.2	0.56	3.6
Debt crisis							
... 0	2051	0.54	0.5	0	0	1	1
... 1	2051	0.46	0.5	0	0	1	1
Regime duration	2114	0.00	1	-0.98	-0.76	0.4	4

Table B3: Gross fixed private capital investment as % of GDP. Source: World Bank. Latest year available.

Country	Private Sector
Dominican Republic	29.98
Benin	29.50
Kosovo	26.91
India	26.70
Democratic Republic of the Congo	24.59
Bangladesh	24.52
Tanzania	24.30
Nepal	23.03
Niger	22.15
Honduras	20.18
El Salvador	19.65
The Gambia	19.01
North Macedonia	18.93
Ethiopia	18.17
Ivory Coast	18.02
Croatia	17.58
Thailand	17.30
Serbia	17.10
Uganda	16.88
Mali	15.41
Madagascar	15.32
Guatemala	15.12
Cameroon	14.95
Haiti	14.20
Sierra Leone	13.07
Nicaragua	12.59
South Africa	11.63
Togo	11.61
Pakistan	11.15
Burundi	10.74
Central African Republic	8.85
Chad	8.84
Fiji	8.43
Zimbabwe	7.40
Egypt	4.36
Lebanon	1.17

Appendix C: Alternative Model Specifications and Robustness Checks

Co-variates in the main models ■ As for the covariates, repression measures are statistically insignificant in the main models. However, in alternative specifications, freedom from political assassinations significantly increases the likelihood of opposition and decreases the probability of support. As for the institutional constraints, indicators of judicial and legislative limits to executive authority are statistically insignificant. Regarding electoral constraints, opposition autonomy is mostly insignificant. Though insignificant in the main models for business opposition, higher polyarchy scores are mostly associated with a higher likelihood of support for the regime across different models.

One interesting finding is that when the state exerts little control over valuable economic capital, the business elite is significantly more likely to oppose and support the regime simultaneously¹. That is a robust finding, especially for the regime's business support base. Furthermore, regime duration does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of business opposition, but the likelihood of business support significantly increases for more durable regimes.

Another interesting finding is that higher levels of polarization are significantly associated with less business support for the regime, though that is mostly insignificant for business opposition. Regarding the support base and social-mobilizational dynamics, the measures for the sizes of support and opposition groups are insignificant in the main models. That said, in some model specifications, the larger support group size is associated with a higher likelihood of opposition.

Lastly, larger pro-autocracy protests significantly decrease the odds of business opposition to the regime, which is a consistent finding across different models. The estimate of pro-democracy mobilization is insignificant in the main models.

1. Higher values indicate less state control over the economy.

Table C1: Main results

	Opposition				Support			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
(Intercept)	-3.92*	-5.04**	-6.96***	-7.21***	-1.49	-2.22	-1.83	-1.81
	(1.76)	(1.83)	(2.00)	(2.00)	(1.75)	(1.85)	(1.76)	(1.85)
Lagged Business Opp.	3.65***	3.57***	3.76***	3.69***				
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)				
Co-optation	-1.14***	-1.03**	-1.03**	-0.95**	1.01***	1.16***	1.00***	1.13***
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Debt crisis	-0.82*	-0.89*	-0.57	-0.64	0.13	0.24	0.07	0.20
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.32)
Freedom from torture	-0.34	-0.63			-0.11	-0.34		
	(0.35)	(0.37)			(0.24)	(0.26)		
State ownership	0.70*	0.52	0.85*	0.80*	1.21***	1.12***	1.36***	1.38***
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.34)
Pro-democracy mobilization	-0.21	-0.23			-0.15	-0.05		
	(0.20)	(0.20)			(0.16)	(0.16)		
Polarization	-0.55	-0.34	-0.38	-0.27	-0.85***	-0.87***	-0.85**	-0.83**
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.29)
Judicial constraints	1.33	-1.20	-0.20	-1.90	-0.21	-0.69	0.05	-0.80
	(1.61)	(1.95)	(1.65)	(2.06)	(1.36)	(1.51)	(1.28)	(1.49)
Opposition Autonomy	0.27	-0.04	-0.17	-0.34	-0.15	-0.57*	-0.09	-0.39
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.28)
Opposition group size	0.06	0.26			0.03	0.20		
	(0.31)	(0.32)			(0.21)	(0.22)		
Regime duration	-0.37	-0.38	-0.35	-0.41	0.52*	0.44*	0.53*	0.45*
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Legislative constraints		1.60		0.65		-1.35		-1.45
		(1.79)		(1.88)		(1.38)		(1.38)
Polyarchy		5.11		3.32		5.81**		5.58**
		(2.73)		(2.85)		(1.94)		(1.94)
Freedom from killing			0.62	0.53			-0.36	-0.41
			(0.34)	(0.35)			(0.23)	(0.24)
Pro-autocracy mobilization			-0.79*	-0.77*			-0.30	-0.24
			(0.38)	(0.38)			(0.26)	(0.28)
Support group size			0.61	0.45			0.03	-0.25
			(0.33)	(0.34)			(0.21)	(0.23)
Lagged Business Sup.					3.00***	3.00***	3.00***	2.98***
					(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	445.14	445.57	437.22	440.81	704.99	694.78	702.66	692.51
BIC	928.31	938.93	920.39	934.17	1188.16	1188.14	1185.83	1185.88
Log Likelihood	-136.57	-134.78	-132.61	-132.40	-266.49	-259.39	-265.33	-258.26
Deviance	273.14	269.57	265.22	264.81	532.99	518.78	530.66	516.51
Num. obs.	2035	2011	2035	2011	2035	2011	2035	2011

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C2: GLM penalized likelihood FE regressions of business opposition
for executive bribery as co-optation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
(Intercept)	-7.30*** (2.01)	-7.57*** (2.01)	-6.96*** (2.00)	-2.15 (1.49)	-7.31*** (2.01)	-5.85** (1.86)	-7.49*** (2.01)	-6.43*** (1.89)	-6.14** (1.90)	-5.93** (1.92)	-5.61** (1.86)	-5.62** (1.90)	-7.21*** (2.00)	-5.30** (1.84)	-5.20** (1.83)
Co-optation	-0.95** (0.32)	-0.87** (0.32)	-1.03** (0.33)	-1.19*** (0.29)	-0.93** (0.32)	-1.15*** (0.32)	-0.88** (0.32)	-0.94** (0.30)	-1.04*** (0.31)	-0.93** (0.31)	-1.21*** (0.33)	-0.79* (0.31)	-0.95** (0.33)	-0.96** (0.31)	-0.87** (0.30)
Debt crisis	-0.51 (0.43)	-0.59 (0.42)	-0.57 (0.43)	-0.63 (0.39)	-0.64 (0.43)	-0.44 (0.42)	-0.59 (0.43)	-0.64 (0.41)	-0.71 (0.42)	-0.71 (0.43)	-0.49 (0.42)	-0.65 (0.42)	-0.64 (0.43)	-0.84* (0.42)	-0.81* (0.40)
Freedom from killing	0.68* (0.34)	0.59 (0.35)	0.62 (0.34)		0.56 (0.35)	0.70* (0.34)	0.57 (0.35)			0.55 (0.34)	0.64 (0.34)	0.60 (0.33)	0.53 (0.35)		
Support group size	0.61 (0.33)	0.43 (0.34)	0.61 (0.33)		0.44 (0.34)		0.44 (0.34)	0.62* (0.32)	0.63* (0.31)	0.60 (0.32)		0.56 (0.33)	0.45 (0.34)	0.66* (0.31)	
Pro-autocracy mobilization	-1.03** (0.33)	-0.94** (0.33)	-0.79* (0.38)		-0.77* (0.38)	-0.96** (0.32)	-0.93** (0.34)	-0.97** (0.32)	-0.70 (0.37)		-0.78* (0.37)		-0.77* (0.38)		
Opposition Autonomy	-0.22 (0.39)	-0.43 (0.41)	-0.17 (0.39)		-0.38 (0.41)	0.03 (0.37)	-0.40 (0.41)	0.03 (0.36)	0.07 (0.36)	-0.03 (0.36)	0.08 (0.37)	-0.03 (0.35)	-0.34 (0.41)	0.13 (0.34)	-0.15 (0.37)
Regime duration	-0.32 (0.27)	-0.41 (0.28)	-0.35 (0.28)		-0.43 (0.28)	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.39 (0.28)	-0.23 (0.26)	-0.26 (0.27)	-0.29 (0.27)	-0.44 (0.27)	-0.27 (0.26)	-0.41 (0.28)	-0.22 (0.27)	-0.39 (0.26)
State ownership	0.73* (0.35)	0.77* (0.35)	0.85* (0.37)		0.85* (0.37)	0.49 (0.36)	0.73* (0.37)	0.75* (0.34)	0.90* (0.36)	0.83* (0.37)	0.60 (0.37)	0.58 (0.34)	0.80* (0.38)	0.90* (0.36)	0.47 (0.34)
Judicial constraints	0.38 (1.58)	-1.29 (1.76)	-0.20 (1.65)		-1.62 (1.80)	0.34 (1.59)	-1.52 (2.02)	2.24 (1.60)	1.49 (1.66)	-0.56 (1.64)	-0.15 (1.65)	0.45 (1.54)	-1.90 (2.06)	1.30 (1.65)	-0.01 (1.69)
Polyarchy		4.37 (2.46)			4.09 (2.47)		3.72 (2.84)						3.32 (2.85)		7.17** (2.43)
Polarization			-0.38 (0.34)		-0.27 (0.34)				-0.47 (0.33)	-0.63 (0.32)	-0.30 (0.33)		-0.27 (0.34)	-0.65* (0.31)	
Opposition group size						0.13 (0.33)					0.09 (0.33)				0.35 (0.32)
Legislative constraints							0.55 (1.88)						0.65 (1.88)		
Freedom from torture								-0.38 (0.36)	-0.42 (0.36)					-0.44 (0.36)	-0.56 (0.36)
Pro-democracy mobilization										-0.16 (0.20)		-0.35 (0.19)		-0.21 (0.20)	-0.26 (0.18)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	435.77	436.33	437.22	437.87	438.22	438.85	438.91	439.30	439.86	439.96	440.43	440.69	440.81	441.58	442.33
BIC	913.32	919.50	920.39	876.10	927.01	916.40	926.67	916.85	923.03	923.13	923.60	918.25	934.17	924.75	925.50
Log Likelihood	-132.88	-132.16	-132.61	-140.94	-132.11	-134.43	-132.46	-134.65	-133.93	-133.98	-134.22	-135.35	-132.40	-134.79	-135.17
Deviance	265.77	264.33	265.22	281.87	264.22	268.85	264.91	269.30	267.86	267.96	268.43	270.69	264.81	269.58	270.33
Num. obs.	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2011	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2011	2035	2035

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C3: GLM penalized likelihood FE regressions of business opposition with neopatrimonialism as co-optation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
(Intercept)	-1.03 (1.60)	-6.17** (2.33)	-2.23 (2.16)	-0.36 (2.12)	-7.70** (2.82)	-5.95* (2.32)	-3.83 (2.18)	-0.78 (2.18)	-2.25 (2.17)	-4.28 (2.26)	-7.47** (2.79)	-3.82 (2.12)	0.81 (2.07)	-0.82 (2.08)	-2.19 (2.06)
Co-optation	-5.44*** (1.37)	-3.63* (1.77)	-6.53*** (1.84)	-6.88*** (1.84)	-2.27 (2.18)	-3.75* (1.78)	-3.99* (1.70)	-6.64*** (1.85)	-6.47*** (1.85)	-3.75* (1.73)	-2.40 (2.16)	-4.42* (1.74)	-7.06*** (1.81)	-6.68*** (1.82)	-4.78** (1.69)
Debt crisis	-0.77 (0.40)	-0.76 (0.44)	-0.89* (0.42)	-1.01* (0.42)	-0.77 (0.44)	-0.75 (0.44)	-0.91* (0.43)	-1.03* (0.42)	-0.89* (0.42)	-0.93* (0.43)	-0.75 (0.44)	-0.80 (0.42)	-1.08** (0.41)	-0.89* (0.41)	-0.97* (0.43)
Freedom from killing		0.52 (0.35)			0.52 (0.35)	0.50 (0.35)	0.36 (0.33)			0.34 (0.33)	0.51 (0.35)	0.43 (0.33)			0.37 (0.32)
Support group size		0.74* (0.31)	0.73* (0.30)	0.74* (0.32)	0.67* (0.32)	0.73* (0.31)	0.65* (0.32)	0.74* (0.31)	0.73* (0.30)	0.67* (0.31)	0.65* (0.32)				
Pro-autocracy mobilization		-0.91** (0.33)	-0.89** (0.32)		-0.88** (0.33)	-0.94* (0.38)			-0.85* (0.37)		-0.93* (0.38)	-0.75* (0.32)		-0.81* (0.32)	
Opposition Autonomy		-0.32 (0.40)	-0.20 (0.34)	-0.06 (0.34)	-0.36 (0.40)	-0.33 (0.39)	-0.22 (0.36)	-0.06 (0.34)	-0.19 (0.34)	-0.21 (0.36)	-0.38 (0.40)	-0.20 (0.37)	0.08 (0.34)	0.00 (0.34)	-0.17 (0.35)
Regime duration		-0.15 (0.27)	0.00 (0.26)	0.01 (0.26)	-0.20 (0.28)	-0.16 (0.27)	-0.15 (0.27)	0.00 (0.26)	-0.00 (0.26)	-0.15 (0.27)	-0.21 (0.28)	-0.31 (0.26)	-0.17 (0.25)	-0.19 (0.25)	-0.30 (0.26)
State ownership		0.74* (0.35)	0.74* (0.33)	0.65* (0.33)	0.75* (0.35)	0.71* (0.36)	0.63 (0.34)	0.71* (0.34)	0.74* (0.34)	0.69 (0.36)	0.71* (0.36)	0.47 (0.35)	0.47 (0.34)	0.50 (0.34)	0.44 (0.35)
Freedom from torture			-0.69 (0.36)	-0.82* (0.37)				-0.83* (0.37)	-0.70 (0.36)				-0.68 (0.35)	-0.63 (0.35)	
Pro-democracy mobilization				-0.46* (0.19)			-0.37* (0.19)	-0.40* (0.20)		-0.32 (0.20)			-0.43* (0.18)		-0.37* (0.18)
Polyarchy					2.11 (2.61)						2.19 (2.62)				
Polarization						0.05 (0.32)		-0.19 (0.28)	-0.05 (0.30)	-0.18 (0.29)	0.10 (0.32)				
Opposition group size												0.17 (0.32)	0.18 (0.31)	0.10 (0.32)	0.26 (0.31)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	434.98	435.91	436.91	437.34	437.95	438.72	438.76	439.41	439.44	440.77	440.84	442.08	442.24	442.50	442.81
BIC	873.20	907.84	908.84	909.27	915.50	916.27	910.70	916.96	916.99	918.32	924.00	914.01	914.17	914.43	914.75
Log Likelihood	-139.49	-133.95	-134.45	-134.67	-133.97	-134.36	-135.38	-134.70	-134.72	-135.38	-134.42	-137.04	-137.12	-137.25	-137.41
Deviance	278.98	267.91	268.91	269.34	267.95	268.72	270.76	269.41	269.44	270.77	268.84	274.08	274.24	274.50	274.81
Num. obs.	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C4: GLM FE regressions of business support with executive bribery as co-optation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
(Intercept)	-1.81 (1.85)	-2.22 (1.85)	-2.58 (1.81)	-2.82 (1.82)	-1.44 (1.79)	-1.90 (1.74)	-1.64 (1.74)	-1.61 (1.75)	-1.83 (1.76)	-1.48 (1.77)	-1.71 (1.76)	-1.66 (1.78)	-1.47 (1.77)	-1.49 (1.75)	-2.32 (1.74)
Co-optation	1.13*** (0.25)	1.16*** (0.25)	1.14*** (0.25)	1.15*** (0.24)	0.95*** (0.23)	0.99*** (0.24)	1.02*** (0.24)	1.03*** (0.24)	1.00*** (0.24)	0.98*** (0.23)	0.98*** (0.24)	0.99*** (0.24)	1.02*** (0.24)	1.01*** (0.24)	0.85*** (0.23)
Debt crisis	0.20 (0.32)	0.24 (0.31)	0.10 (0.31)	0.16 (0.30)	0.23 (0.31)	0.06 (0.30)	0.04 (0.30)	0.05 (0.30)	0.07 (0.30)	0.25 (0.31)	0.14 (0.30)	0.15 (0.30)	0.13 (0.30)	0.13 (0.30)	0.15 (0.30)
Freedom from killing	-0.41 (0.24)		-0.48* (0.24)		-0.29 (0.23)	-0.35 (0.23)	-0.39 (0.23)	-0.39 (0.23)	-0.36 (0.23)						-0.35 (0.23)
Support group size	-0.25 (0.23)		-0.15 (0.23)		-0.22 (0.23)			0.02 (0.21)	0.03 (0.21)			0.02 (0.22)	0.01 (0.22)		-0.03 (0.22)
Pro-autocracy mobilization	-0.24 (0.28)		-0.16 (0.27)		-0.62** (0.24)	-0.33 (0.27)			-0.30 (0.26)		-0.32 (0.27)	-0.29 (0.26)			-0.57* (0.23)
Opposition autonomy	-0.39 (0.28)	-0.57* (0.29)	-0.35 (0.28)	-0.54 (0.29)	-0.39 (0.28)	-0.10 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.26)	-0.51 (0.28)	-0.15 (0.26)	-0.14 (0.26)	-0.15 (0.26)	-0.15 (0.26)	-0.31 (0.28)
Regime duration	0.45* (0.21)	0.44* (0.21)	0.43* (0.21)	0.41 (0.21)	0.38 (0.20)	0.51* (0.21)	0.55** (0.21)	0.55** (0.21)	0.53* (0.21)	0.38 (0.20)	0.50* (0.21)	0.51* (0.21)	0.53* (0.21)	0.52* (0.21)	0.34 (0.20)
State ownership of economy	1.38*** (0.34)	1.12*** (0.32)	1.30*** (0.31)	1.05*** (0.30)	1.30*** (0.33)	1.33*** (0.32)	1.36*** (0.32)	1.37*** (0.31)	1.36*** (0.31)	1.10*** (0.31)	1.20*** (0.30)	1.23*** (0.30)	1.22*** (0.29)	1.21*** (0.30)	1.20*** (0.31)
Judicial constraints	-0.80 (1.49)	-0.69 (1.51)	-1.36 (1.40)	-1.25 (1.43)	-0.16 (1.46)	0.19 (1.29)	0.38 (1.28)	0.30 (1.27)	0.05 (1.28)	0.41 (1.47)	-0.40 (1.37)	-0.43 (1.37)	-0.24 (1.36)	-0.21 (1.36)	-0.80 (1.37)
Polyarchy	5.58** (1.94)	5.81** (1.94)	5.10** (1.78)	5.51** (1.80)	4.88** (1.89)					5.15** (1.90)					4.00* (1.72)
Legislative constraints	-1.45 (1.38)	-1.35 (1.38)			-1.76 (1.34)					-1.81 (1.34)					
Polarization	-0.83** (0.29)	-0.87*** (0.26)	-1.00*** (0.27)	-0.98*** (0.26)		-0.86** (0.27)	-0.90*** (0.26)	-0.89*** (0.25)	-0.85** (0.27)		-0.80** (0.26)	-0.80** (0.26)	-0.85*** (0.25)	-0.85*** (0.25)	
Freedom from torture		-0.34 (0.26)		-0.39 (0.26)						-0.27 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.24)	-0.11 (0.24)	-0.12 (0.24)	-0.11 (0.24)	
Opposition group size		0.20 (0.22)		0.18 (0.22)		0.10 (0.21)	0.05 (0.21)			0.09 (0.21)	0.08 (0.21)			0.03 (0.21)	
Pro-democracy mobilization		-0.05 (0.16)		-0.07 (0.16)			-0.19 (0.16)	-0.18 (0.16)		-0.22 (0.15)			-0.15 (0.16)	-0.15 (0.16)	
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	692.51	694.78	696.38	697.64	698.34	702.50	702.52	702.56	702.66	702.94	704.60	704.67	704.98	704.99	706.89
BIC	1185.88	1188.14	1185.17	1186.42	1186.09	1185.67	1185.69	1185.73	1185.83	1190.70	1187.77	1187.84	1188.15	1188.16	1190.06
Log Likelihood	-258.26	-259.39	-261.19	-261.82	-262.17	-265.25	-265.26	-265.28	-265.33	-264.47	-266.30	-266.34	-266.49	-266.49	-267.44
Deviance	516.51	518.78	522.38	523.64	524.34	530.50	530.52	530.56	530.66	528.94	532.60	532.67	532.98	532.99	534.89
Num. obs.	2011	2011	2035	2035	2011	2035	2035	2035	2035	2011	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C5: GLM FE regressions of business support with neo-patrimonialism as co-optation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
(Intercept)	-7.43*** (2.19)	-7.63*** (2.22)	-6.59** (2.14)	-6.20** (2.16)	-3.35 (1.80)	-3.45 (1.85)	-4.13* (1.90)	-4.12* (1.94)	-2.90 (1.85)	-2.88 (1.81)	-3.64 (1.93)	-3.67 (1.89)	-3.81* (1.93)	-3.69 (1.89)	-3.19 (1.84)
Co-optation	7.80*** (1.68)	7.85*** (1.72)	6.70*** (1.61)	6.71*** (1.67)	4.16** (1.36)	4.35** (1.33)	5.04*** (1.50)	5.17*** (1.49)	4.19** (1.32)	4.17** (1.36)	5.04*** (1.47)	5.02*** (1.48)	4.58** (1.47)	4.40** (1.47)	3.84** (1.31)
Debt crisis	0.24 (0.31)	0.31 (0.30)	0.24 (0.30)	0.28 (0.30)	0.21 (0.30)	0.21 (0.30)	0.26 (0.30)	0.26 (0.30)	0.22 (0.30)	0.22 (0.30)	0.28 (0.30)	0.28 (0.30)	0.28 (0.29)	0.28 (0.30)	0.23 (0.30)
Freedom from killing	-0.27 (0.23)		-0.18 (0.22)		-0.15 (0.22)	-0.15 (0.22)			-0.17 (0.22)	-0.16 (0.22)					-0.09 (0.22)
Support group size	-0.20 (0.23)		-0.09 (0.22)			0.01 (0.21)		-0.02 (0.21)	0.01 (0.21)		-0.03 (0.21)		0.05 (0.21)		0.08 (0.21)
Pro-autocracy mobilization	-0.25 (0.26)		-0.56* (0.23)		-0.46 (0.26)	-0.44 (0.26)	-0.46 (0.26)	-0.43 (0.26)					-0.67** (0.23)	-0.69** (0.23)	-0.68** (0.23)
Opposition autonomy	-0.13 (0.26)	-0.24 (0.26)	-0.16 (0.26)	-0.21 (0.26)	0.19 (0.24)	0.20 (0.24)	0.13 (0.24)	0.15 (0.24)	0.23 (0.24)	0.23 (0.24)	0.18 (0.23)	0.17 (0.23)	0.12 (0.24)	0.11 (0.24)	0.15 (0.24)
Regime duration	0.33 (0.21)	0.34 (0.21)	0.27 (0.20)	0.27 (0.20)	0.43* (0.20)	0.45* (0.20)	0.44* (0.20)	0.45* (0.20)	0.47* (0.20)	0.47* (0.20)	0.47* (0.20)	0.47* (0.20)	0.40* (0.20)	0.37 (0.20)	0.39* (0.20)
State ownership of economy	1.42*** (0.32)	1.21*** (0.31)	1.32*** (0.31)	1.18*** (0.30)	1.33*** (0.32)	1.37*** (0.31)	1.29*** (0.31)	1.33*** (0.31)	1.34*** (0.31)	1.33*** (0.32)	1.29*** (0.30)	1.27*** (0.31)	1.30*** (0.30)	1.27*** (0.31)	1.32*** (0.31)
Polyarchy	6.88*** (1.95)	6.88*** (1.94)	6.05** (1.91)	6.24** (1.91)											
Polarization	-0.76** (0.26)	-0.79** (0.25)			-0.60* (0.25)	-0.60* (0.26)	-0.58* (0.25)	-0.58* (0.25)	-0.69** (0.24)	-0.69** (0.24)	-0.67** (0.24)	-0.67** (0.24)			
Freedom from torture		-0.14 (0.24)		-0.07 (0.24)			0.14 (0.24)	0.13 (0.24)			0.13 (0.24)	0.13 (0.23)	0.14 (0.24)	0.16 (0.24)	
Opposition group size		0.18 (0.22)		0.05 (0.21)	0.07 (0.21)		0.10 (0.22)			0.00 (0.21)		0.02 (0.21)		0.08 (0.21)	
Pro-democracy mobilization		-0.07 (0.16)		-0.24 (0.15)					-0.18 (0.16)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.16)			
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	698.76	700.60	704.79	708.02	709.85	709.89	710.00	710.09	711.37	711.38	711.64	711.68	712.69	712.71	712.85
BIC	1181.93	1183.77	1182.34	1185.57	1187.41	1187.45	1187.55	1187.64	1188.92	1188.93	1189.20	1189.23	1184.63	1184.64	1184.78
Log Likelihood	-263.38	-264.30	-267.40	-269.01	-269.93	-269.95	-270.00	-270.04	-270.68	-270.69	-270.82	-270.84	-272.35	-272.36	-272.42
Deviance	526.76	528.60	534.79	538.02	539.85	539.89	540.00	540.09	541.37	541.38	541.64	541.68	544.69	544.71	544.85
Num. obs.	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C6: GLMM regressions of business opposition with executive bribery as co-optation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
(Intercept)	-32.03*** (4.22)	-31.69*** (4.23)	-32.11*** (4.19)	-31.65*** (4.21)	-26.62*** (3.41)	-26.42*** (3.45)	-26.19*** (3.40)	-26.00*** (3.43)	-29.18*** (4.25)	-28.20*** (4.06)	-27.65*** (3.95)	-27.97*** (4.04)	-26.89*** (3.78)	-29.15*** (4.41)	-27.08*** (3.76)
Co-optation	-1.11* (0.47)	-1.17* (0.48)	-1.01* (0.46)	-1.08* (0.47)	-0.80 (0.44)	-0.81 (0.44)	-0.87 (0.45)	-0.89 (0.46)	-1.26** (0.42)	-1.15** (0.44)	-1.06* (0.45)	-1.06* (0.42)	-1.15** (0.43)	-1.17** (0.41)	-0.91* (0.42)
Debt crisis	0.34 (0.58)	0.29 (0.58)	0.42 (0.58)	0.37 (0.58)	0.73 (0.59)	0.63 (0.59)	0.71 (0.59)	0.61 (0.59)	0.52 (0.56)	0.57 (0.57)	0.40 (0.57)	0.63 (0.58)	0.31 (0.55)	0.62 (0.57)	0.37 (0.57)
Freedom from torture	-1.30* (0.52)	-1.30* (0.52)	-1.17* (0.52)	-1.17* (0.52)					-0.98 (0.54)				-0.76 (0.52)	-0.89 (0.53)	
Opposition group size	2.33*** (0.58)	2.31*** (0.58)	2.20*** (0.57)	2.17*** (0.57)					1.67** (0.52)	1.83*** (0.52)	1.90*** (0.53)	1.66** (0.51)	1.71** (0.52)	1.44** (0.50)	1.80*** (0.52)
Pro-democracy mobilization	-0.24 (0.25)	-0.30 (0.26)	-0.44 (0.23)	-0.50* (0.25)							-0.26 (0.25)	-0.27 (0.25)	-0.27 (0.25)	-0.48* (0.24)	
Opposition Autonomy	-1.89** (0.71)	-1.82* (0.71)	-1.87** (0.70)	-1.81* (0.71)	-1.30* (0.63)	-1.26* (0.64)	-1.26* (0.63)	-1.21 (0.64)	-0.48 (0.62)	-1.01 (0.60)	-1.10 (0.59)	-0.89 (0.59)	-0.61 (0.60)	-0.35 (0.61)	-1.02 (0.58)
Regime duration	-3.51*** (0.61)	-3.48*** (0.61)	-3.32*** (0.61)	-3.28*** (0.61)	-3.58*** (0.64)	-3.67*** (0.65)	-3.57*** (0.64)	-3.66*** (0.65)	-3.31*** (0.61)	-3.27*** (0.62)	-3.21*** (0.61)	-2.91*** (0.57)	-3.15*** (0.60)	-3.00*** (0.59)	-2.79*** (0.56)
State ownership	-1.28* (0.58)	-1.44* (0.63)	-1.19* (0.59)	-1.35* (0.64)	-0.66 (0.55)	-0.66 (0.55)	-0.81 (0.59)	-0.82 (0.59)	-1.26* (0.54)	-1.42* (0.57)	-1.42* (0.57)	-1.47** (0.57)	-1.20* (0.54)	-1.23* (0.54)	-1.50** (0.58)
Judicial constraints	5.06 (2.74)	4.00 (3.13)	5.20 (2.72)	4.03 (3.13)	1.03 (2.46)	1.08 (2.50)	-0.09 (2.95)	-0.06 (2.98)	10.50*** (2.56)	8.12*** (2.31)	7.99*** (2.28)	8.54*** (2.33)	9.61*** (2.45)	11.15*** (2.58)	8.60*** (2.28)
Polyarchy	16.47*** (4.13)	14.88** (4.69)	17.42*** (4.06)	15.76*** (4.60)	13.34*** (3.71)	12.62*** (3.78)	12.14** (4.08)	11.33** (4.18)							
Polarization	-1.06* (0.52)	-1.06* (0.52)				-0.53 (0.50)		-0.54 (0.50)	-1.23* (0.48)	-1.01* (0.47)	-1.10* (0.47)		-1.41** (0.49)		
Legislative constraints		1.88 (2.64)		1.98 (2.60)			1.75 (2.48)	1.83 (2.49)							
Freedom from killing					0.55 (0.52)	0.52 (0.52)	0.55 (0.52)	0.51 (0.52)		0.93 (0.55)	1.06 (0.55)	1.08* (0.54)			1.27* (0.54)
Support group size					-1.36** (0.44)	-1.39** (0.45)	-1.38** (0.44)	-1.41** (0.45)							
Pro-autocracy mobilization					-0.96* (0.47)	-0.77 (0.50)	-0.98* (0.46)	-0.78 (0.49)	-1.18* (0.55)	-0.83 (0.52)		-1.27* (0.50)		-1.72** (0.55)	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	491.76	493.20	493.94	495.29	503.10	503.98	504.59	505.44	506.34	506.66	508.18	509.32	510.08	510.82	511.61
Log Likelihood	-204.88	-204.60	-206.97	-206.64	-211.55	-210.99	-211.30	-210.72	-213.17	-213.33	-214.09	-215.66	-215.04	-216.41	-216.80
Num. obs.	2041	2017	2041	2017	2041	2041	2017	2017	2041	2041	2041	2041	2041	2041	2041
Num. groups: Country	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Num. groups: Year	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
Country (Intercept)	487.34	488.97	464.56	463.22	347.53	361.98	340.66	356.16	481.59	476.91	493.97	435.01	460.90	436.65	449.82
Year (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C7: GLMM regressions of business support with executive bribery as co-optation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
(Intercept)	-1.47 (1.32)	-0.94 (1.34)	-1.08 (1.34)	-1.39 (1.34)	-2.69* (1.29)	-1.55 (1.27)	-2.00 (1.24)	-2.20 (1.31)	-1.90 (1.33)	-1.86 (1.35)	-2.41 (1.35)	-1.69 (1.35)	-1.68 (1.35)	-2.27 (1.43)
Co-optation	1.31*** (0.25)	1.28*** (0.25)	1.31*** (0.25)	1.33*** (0.25)	1.23*** (0.24)	1.13*** (0.24)	1.12*** (0.23)	1.35*** (0.24)	1.30*** (0.25)	1.37*** (0.25)	1.43*** (0.25)	1.36*** (0.25)	1.34*** (0.25)	1.41*** (0.25)
Debt crisis	0.75* (0.32)	0.86** (0.32)	0.85** (0.32)	0.76* (0.32)	0.88** (0.32)	0.89** (0.32)	0.81** (0.31)	0.59 (0.30)	0.58 (0.30)	0.59 (0.30)	0.66* (0.30)	0.66* (0.30)	0.65* (0.30)	0.66* (0.30)
Freedom from killing	-0.34 (0.24)			-0.28 (0.24)	-0.18 (0.22)		-0.12 (0.22)	-0.47* (0.23)	-0.44 (0.24)	-0.41 (0.24)				
Opposition group size	-0.02 (0.21)		-0.02 (0.21)							-0.08 (0.20)	-0.03 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.20)		-0.03 (0.21)
Pro-autocracy mobilization	-0.53 (0.27)	-0.54* (0.26)	-0.50 (0.27)		-0.84*** (0.25)	-0.92*** (0.24)	-0.95*** (0.24)	-0.29 (0.26)	-0.35 (0.25)					
Opposition Autonomy	-0.45 (0.28)	-0.42 (0.28)	-0.44 (0.28)	-0.42 (0.28)	-0.68* (0.29)	-0.43 (0.28)	-0.45 (0.27)	-0.51 (0.28)	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.40 (0.27)	-0.60* (0.28)	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.57 (0.30)
Regime duration	0.93*** (0.23)	0.87*** (0.23)	0.94*** (0.23)	0.94*** (0.23)	0.81*** (0.22)	0.86*** (0.22)	0.86*** (0.22)	0.80*** (0.23)	0.84*** (0.23)	0.90*** (0.22)	0.89*** (0.22)	0.91*** (0.22)	0.89*** (0.23)	0.88*** (0.22)
State ownership	2.53*** (0.35)	2.41*** (0.34)	2.43*** (0.34)	2.46*** (0.35)	2.48*** (0.34)	2.41*** (0.33)	2.45*** (0.34)	2.33*** (0.33)	2.35*** (0.33)	2.32*** (0.32)	2.19*** (0.32)	2.22*** (0.32)	2.20*** (0.32)	2.19*** (0.32)
Polarization	-1.13*** (0.29)	-1.04*** (0.28)	-1.03*** (0.28)	-1.41*** (0.29)				-1.46*** (0.29)	-1.42*** (0.28)	-1.56*** (0.28)	-1.47*** (0.27)	-1.46*** (0.27)	-1.47*** (0.27)	-1.48*** (0.27)
Judicial constraints	2.70 (1.44)	1.85 (1.49)	1.73 (1.49)	3.03* (1.44)	3.14* (1.45)	2.66 (1.46)	3.49* (1.42)		0.62 (1.24)	0.63 (1.23)		-0.02 (1.32)	0.05 (1.32)	-0.38 (1.36)
Legislative constraints	-4.16** (1.28)	-4.41*** (1.31)	-4.40*** (1.31)	-3.94** (1.28)	-5.68*** (1.37)	-4.68*** (1.28)	-4.38*** (1.25)							
Freedom from torture		0.18 (0.25)	0.11 (0.25)			0.23 (0.25)					-0.23 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.24)	-0.05 (0.24)	-0.20 (0.25)
Support group size		-0.29 (0.22)		-0.18 (0.22)	-0.30 (0.22)	-0.25 (0.22)	-0.20 (0.21)	-0.16 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.21)				-0.09 (0.21)	
Pro-democracy mobilization				0.09 (0.15)						0.09 (0.15)	0.16 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	0.16 (0.15)
Polyarchy					4.30* (1.83)			1.99 (1.58)			2.17 (1.72)			2.27 (1.76)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	1005.13	1005.27	1007.00	1008.07	1014.76	1017.82	1018.41	1020.72	1022.05	1023.69	1024.92	1026.52	1026.54	1026.85
Log Likelihood	-461.57	-461.64	-462.50	-463.04	-466.38	-468.91	-469.21	-470.36	-471.02	-471.85	-472.46	-473.26	-473.27	-472.42
Num. obs.	2017	2017	2017	2017	2017	2017	2017	2041	2041	2041	2041	2041	2041	2041
Num. groups: Country	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Num. groups: Year	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
Country (Intercept)	52.28	51.09	51.23	54.91	47.07	44.84	44.65	54.17	52.90	55.24	54.69	53.51	53.27	54.81
Year (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C8: Linear FE regressions of business support with executive bribery as co-optation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Co-optation	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)
Debt crisis	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Freedom from killing	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)			-0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)		-0.004 (0.003)				
Support group size	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)		0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)		0.005 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)		0.005 (0.003)			0.004 (0.003)		
Pro-autocracy mobilization	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)			-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)			-0.011*** (0.003)	
Opposition Autonomy	0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Regime duration	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
State ownership	0.012** (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)	0.011* (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)	0.011* (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)	0.011* (0.004)
Judicial constraints	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.025 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.019)
Polyarchy	0.032 (0.022)			0.039 (0.022)								0.039 (0.022)			
Polarization	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)		-0.006* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)		-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)			-0.008** (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)		-0.009*** (0.003)
Opposition group size			0.003 (0.003)			0.003 (0.003)			0.003 (0.003)		0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)		0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Freedom from torture					-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)				-0.002 (0.004)		-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Pro-democracy mobilization								-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.677	0.677	0.677	0.676	0.676	0.676	0.676	0.676	0.676	0.676	0.675	0.676	0.676	0.675	0.675
Adj. R ²	0.658	0.658	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.656	0.656	0.656	0.656	0.656	0.656
Num. obs.	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C9: Linear FE models of business opposition with executive bribery as co-optation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Co-optation	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
Debt crisis	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Freedom from killing		0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)			0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)				-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)		
Support group size		0.005* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)		0.004 (0.002)		0.004 (0.002)		
Pro-autocracy mobilization		0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)			0.003 (0.002)				0.002 (0.002)
Opposition Autonomy		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Regime duration		-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
State ownership		-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Judicial constraints		0.008 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	0.006 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)	0.012 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.006 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)
Polyarchy		-0.033* (0.014)	-0.036* (0.014)							-0.026 (0.014)		-0.030* (0.015)			
Polarization			-0.002 (0.002)					-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)		
Freedom from torture				-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)		-0.000 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Pro-democracy mobilization				0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)			0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	
Opposition group size										-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.748	0.750	0.750	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.749
Adj. R ²	0.734	0.735	0.735	0.734	0.734	0.734	0.734	0.734	0.734	0.734	0.734	0.734	0.734	0.734	0.734
Num. obs.	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969	1969

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C10: GLM PL-FE regressions of conservative measure of business opposition
with executive bribery as co-optation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
(Intercept)	-0.982 (1.556)	-0.497 (2.148)	-1.537 (2.238)	-1.231 (2.263)	0.792 (2.095)	-0.336 (2.166)	-3.113 (2.250)	-1.463 (2.118)	-2.219 (2.169)	-1.506 (2.221)	-0.617 (2.133)	-0.658 (2.158)	0.603 (2.087)	-3.529 (2.349)	-2.160 (2.174)
Co-optation	-1.877*** (0.396)	-2.326*** (0.463)	-2.208*** (0.450)	-2.124*** (0.441)	-2.093*** (0.423)	-2.043*** (0.412)	-2.023*** (0.420)	-2.444*** (0.460)	-2.307*** (0.439)	-2.286*** (0.465)	-2.089*** (0.401)	-2.142*** (0.450)	-2.171*** (0.418)	-2.099*** (0.441)	-2.412*** (0.460)
Debt crisis	-1.602** (0.575)	-1.111 (0.580)	-1.106 (0.580)	-1.130* (0.562)	-1.389* (0.581)	-1.391* (0.581)	-1.198* (0.570)	-1.282* (0.578)	-1.362* (0.587)	-0.984 (0.564)	-1.639** (0.591)	-1.208* (0.581)	-1.658** (0.591)	-1.434* (0.589)	-1.259* (0.573)
Freedom from torture		1.774** (0.561)	1.499** (0.540)	1.189* (0.577)	1.548** (0.530)	1.162* (0.508)				1.394** (0.530)		1.719** (0.547)			
Opposition group size		-0.075 (0.412)		0.167 (0.423)	-0.065 (0.406)			-0.188 (0.420)				-0.009 (0.403)	-0.225 (0.417)		
Pro-autocracy mobilization		-0.492 (0.405)	-0.334 (0.388)				0.211 (0.363)	-0.638 (0.415)	-0.440 (0.385)	-0.134 (0.471)		-0.578 (0.481)		0.164 (0.361)	-0.172 (0.459)
Opposition autonomy		1.599** (0.546)	1.467** (0.530)	1.100* (0.537)	1.157* (0.475)	1.036* (0.468)	0.943 (0.521)	1.561** (0.539)	1.378** (0.525)	1.500** (0.530)	1.054* (0.458)	1.397** (0.525)	1.270** (0.474)	0.837 (0.520)	1.450** (0.531)
Regime duration		-1.180** (0.425)	-0.982* (0.415)	-1.133** (0.410)	-0.951* (0.396)	-0.765* (0.388)	-0.979* (0.405)	-1.562*** (0.439)	-1.111** (0.414)	-0.976* (0.421)	-0.849* (0.382)	-1.029* (0.412)	-1.232** (0.404)	-0.961* (0.401)	-1.111** (0.422)
State ownership of economy		-0.012 (0.425)	0.037 (0.413)	-0.264 (0.416)	-0.073 (0.408)	0.011 (0.397)	-0.128 (0.402)	0.359 (0.436)	0.321 (0.433)	0.097 (0.420)	0.196 (0.406)	-0.083 (0.425)	0.174 (0.407)	-0.239 (0.416)	0.397 (0.444)
Judicial constraints		-8.764** (2.685)	-8.059** (2.592)	-11.513*** (2.924)	-8.155** (2.561)	-7.372** (2.472)	-9.999*** (2.783)	-3.477 (2.338)	-4.161 (2.328)	-8.287** (2.663)	-4.403* (2.201)	-8.136** (2.717)	-3.677 (2.209)	-11.779*** (3.002)	-4.730* (2.393)
Support group size			0.692 (0.511)			0.745 (0.497)	0.852 (0.547)		0.951 (0.510)	0.871 (0.515)	1.040* (0.494)			0.759 (0.534)	1.194* (0.529)
Pro-democracy mobilization				-0.139 (0.260)	-0.430 (0.250)	-0.444 (0.254)					-0.548* (0.260)		-0.522* (0.252)		
Polyarchy				9.648* (3.886)			13.322*** (4.038)							11.591** (4.301)	
Freedom from killing							-0.057 (0.388)	0.264 (0.361)	0.172 (0.367)		-0.025 (0.361)		0.007 (0.352)	-0.071 (0.381)	0.112 (0.370)
Polarization										-0.209 (0.395)		0.158 (0.384)			-0.268 (0.391)
Legislative constraints														3.345 (2.633)	
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	274.713	278.114	278.763	279.214	279.761	279.919	280.089	280.429	280.803	281.504	281.555	281.942	281.978	282.198	283.076
BIC	712.937	755.665	756.315	762.384	757.312	757.471	763.258	757.980	758.354	764.674	759.107	765.112	759.529	769.954	766.246
Log Likelihood	-59.357	-54.057	-54.382	-53.607	-54.880	-54.960	-54.044	-55.214	-55.401	-54.752	-55.778	-54.971	-55.989	-54.099	-55.538
Deviance	118.713	108.114	108.763	107.214	109.760	109.919	108.089	110.429	110.803	109.504	111.555	109.941	111.977	108.198	111.076
Num. obs.	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2011	2035

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C11: GLM PL-FE regressions of conservative measure of business support
with executive bribery as co-optation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
(Intercept)	-4.052** (1.387)	-4.201** (1.370)	-4.264** (1.380)	-4.080** (1.391)	-6.235*** (1.581)	-6.094*** (1.570)	-4.996*** (1.485)	-3.753** (1.399)	-6.120*** (1.550)	-3.788** (1.411)	-4.963*** (1.474)	-3.607** (1.384)	-3.703** (1.397)	-5.788*** (1.487)	-5.284*** (1.481)
Co-optation	-0.169 (0.263)	-0.173 (0.271)	-0.169 (0.270)	-0.163 (0.261)	0.319 (0.279)	0.325 (0.279)	0.178 (0.277)	-0.049 (0.263)	0.219 (0.287)	-0.024 (0.270)	0.197 (0.277)	-0.059 (0.261)	-0.031 (0.268)	0.409 (0.283)	0.133 (0.285)
Debt crisis	-0.355 (0.394)	-0.165 (0.386)	-0.200 (0.386)	-0.368 (0.393)	-0.025 (0.390)	-0.039 (0.390)	-0.081 (0.387)	-0.189 (0.391)	0.011 (0.381)	0.045 (0.379)	-0.078 (0.385)	-0.190 (0.390)	0.055 (0.378)	0.099 (0.378)	-0.048 (0.377)
Freedom from killing	-0.412 (0.256)			-0.410 (0.256)	-0.499 (0.261)	-0.503 (0.258)	-0.530* (0.258)	-0.465 (0.256)			-0.535* (0.254)	-0.460 (0.254)			
Opposition group size	1.047*** (0.313)	1.037** (0.318)	1.105*** (0.332)	1.066** (0.325)					1.179*** (0.340)					0.797** (0.300)	1.150*** (0.337)
Pro-autocracy mobilization	-1.423*** (0.281)	-1.321*** (0.282)	-1.211*** (0.324)	-1.381*** (0.320)	-1.084*** (0.274)	-1.280*** (0.316)	-0.990*** (0.264)	-1.124*** (0.261)		-1.025*** (0.264)	-1.197*** (0.307)	-1.261*** (0.307)	-1.125*** (0.312)		
Opposition autonomy	0.239 (0.292)	0.092 (0.299)	0.093 (0.299)	0.239 (0.292)	-0.577 (0.325)	-0.601 (0.327)	-0.478 (0.324)	-0.136 (0.289)	-0.471 (0.331)	-0.220 (0.297)	-0.515 (0.326)	-0.120 (0.287)	-0.206 (0.294)	-0.552 (0.326)	-0.381 (0.328)
Regime duration	0.143 (0.244)	0.042 (0.250)	0.018 (0.254)	0.139 (0.244)	0.209 (0.256)	0.216 (0.253)	0.156 (0.258)	0.273 (0.249)	-0.234 (0.272)	0.143 (0.252)	0.167 (0.255)	0.290 (0.246)	0.163 (0.250)	-0.111 (0.261)	-0.255 (0.270)
State ownership of economy	1.301*** (0.359)	1.222*** (0.358)	1.218*** (0.355)	1.289*** (0.357)	1.359*** (0.375)	1.314*** (0.377)	1.605*** (0.370)	1.578*** (0.370)	1.230*** (0.369)	1.421*** (0.361)	1.564*** (0.372)	1.545*** (0.370)	1.388*** (0.361)	1.082** (0.365)	1.341*** (0.358)
Judicial constraints	-0.221 (1.748)	-2.112 (1.832)	-2.189 (1.849)	-0.197 (1.747)	-2.099 (1.882)	-2.257 (1.870)	-1.400 (1.822)	-0.280 (1.739)	-3.585 (1.941)	-2.325 (1.798)	-1.668 (1.800)	-0.303 (1.718)	-2.223 (1.792)	-3.166 (1.876)	-3.398 (1.849)
Freedom from torture		0.442 (0.317)	0.473 (0.317)						0.544 (0.321)	0.475 (0.312)			0.453 (0.312)	0.457 (0.319)	0.577 (0.320)
Polarization			-0.176 (0.283)	-0.063 (0.282)		0.360 (0.290)			-0.666* (0.264)		0.375 (0.279)	0.234 (0.272)	0.162 (0.270)		-0.640* (0.258)
Support group size					0.017 (0.292)	-0.025 (0.293)	0.087 (0.284)	0.197 (0.272)		0.070 (0.279)	0.051 (0.285)	0.181 (0.271)	0.054 (0.277)		
Polyarchy					3.485 (2.602)	4.359 (2.732)	5.250* (2.449)		5.320 (2.811)		6.123* (2.563)			6.812* (2.897)	5.759* (2.527)
Legislative constraints					3.028 (1.581)	2.846 (1.581)			1.487 (1.594)					1.174 (1.559)	
Pro-democracy mobilization									-0.202 (0.178)					-0.369* (0.169)	-0.179 (0.176)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	482.968	483.145	485.194	485.384	485.572	487.238	489.944	490.106	490.497	490.650	491.519	492.364	493.108	493.473	494.316
BIC	960.519	960.697	968.364	968.553	973.328	980.600	973.114	967.658	983.859	968.201	980.307	975.534	976.277	981.228	983.104
Log Likelihood	-156.484	-156.573	-156.597	-156.692	-155.786	-155.619	-158.972	-160.053	-157.249	-160.325	-158.760	-160.182	-160.554	-159.736	-160.158
Deviance	312.968	313.145	313.194	313.384	311.572	311.238	317.944	320.106	314.497	320.650	317.519	320.364	321.108	319.473	320.316
Num. obs.	2035	2035	2035	2035	2011	2011	2035	2035	2011	2035	2035	2035	2035	2011	2035

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C12: Main regressions without lagged DV.

	Opposition				Support			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
(Intercept)	-4.32** (1.66)	-5.97*** (1.72)	-6.23*** (1.85)	-6.99*** (1.87)	0.52 (1.74)	1.02 (1.79)	0.45 (1.72)	1.30 (1.77)
Co-optation	-1.15*** (0.26)	-1.04*** (0.27)	-0.82** (0.27)	-0.75** (0.28)	1.16*** (0.21)	1.31*** (0.22)	1.15*** (0.21)	1.32*** (0.22)
Debt crisis	-0.65 (0.34)	-0.66 (0.35)	-0.54 (0.35)	-0.55 (0.35)	0.52* (0.25)	0.71** (0.27)	0.41 (0.26)	0.60* (0.27)
Freedom from torture	-0.42 (0.29)	-0.68* (0.30)			0.02 (0.21)	-0.04 (0.23)		
State ownership	0.33 (0.31)	0.21 (0.34)	0.65* (0.32)	0.55 (0.34)	1.91*** (0.26)	2.07*** (0.28)	2.05*** (0.27)	2.28*** (0.30)
Pro-democracy mobilization	0.14 (0.16)	0.14 (0.16)			0.13 (0.14)	0.20 (0.14)		
Polarization	-0.16 (0.25)	0.12 (0.27)	0.22 (0.29)	0.47 (0.30)	-1.30*** (0.23)	-1.11*** (0.24)	-1.32*** (0.24)	-1.10*** (0.26)
Judicial constraints	2.16 (1.31)	-0.62 (1.64)	0.44 (1.30)	-2.51 (1.71)	-0.40 (1.17)	0.92 (1.31)	0.46 (1.12)	1.47 (1.29)
Opposition Autonomy	0.60 (0.35)	0.02 (0.36)	0.51 (0.34)	0.25 (0.36)	-0.39 (0.23)	-0.78** (0.26)	-0.39 (0.23)	-0.70** (0.25)
Opposition group size	0.54* (0.27)	0.78** (0.28)			-0.01 (0.18)	0.15 (0.18)		
Regime duration	-0.26 (0.22)	-0.34 (0.23)	-0.28 (0.23)	-0.37 (0.24)	0.93*** (0.18)	0.94*** (0.19)	0.99*** (0.19)	0.97*** (0.19)
Legislative constraints		1.11 (1.57)		1.61 (1.57)		-4.40*** (1.21)		-4.16*** (1.19)
Polyarchy		7.91** (2.53)		5.01* (2.46)		5.69*** (1.71)		5.62*** (1.67)
Freedom from killing			0.51 (0.27)	0.41 (0.26)			-0.34 (0.20)	-0.32 (0.21)
Pro-autocracy mobilization			-0.40 (0.33)	-0.43 (0.33)			0.04 (0.22)	0.07 (0.24)
Support group size			0.31 (0.27)	0.10 (0.28)			0.06 (0.18)	-0.16 (0.20)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	604.59	594.72	603.42	599.96	917.32	897.00	915.40	896.28
BIC	1082.40	1082.74	1081.22	1087.98	1395.12	1385.01	1393.21	1384.29
Log Likelihood	-217.30	-210.36	-216.71	-212.98	-373.66	-361.50	-372.70	-361.14
Deviance	434.59	420.72	433.42	425.96	747.32	723.00	745.40	722.28
Num. obs.	2041	2017	2041	2017	2041	2017	2041	2017

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C13: GLM PL-FE regressions of business opposition
with executive bribery as co-optation. Interactions with debt crisis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
(Intercept)	-7.421*** (2.027)	-7.644*** (2.024)	-2.307 (1.503)	-7.044*** (2.007)	-7.368*** (2.020)	-5.924** (1.869)	-7.551*** (2.018)	-6.583*** (1.907)	-6.071** (1.932)	-6.280*** (1.907)	-5.852** (1.926)	-5.675** (1.868)	-7.265*** (2.012)	-5.529** (1.859)	-5.441** (1.847)
Co-optation	-0.842* (0.358)	-0.785* (0.355)	-1.044*** (0.317)	-0.932** (0.359)	-0.846* (0.357)	-1.045** (0.354)	-0.797* (0.358)	-0.817* (0.342)	-0.818* (0.347)	-0.925** (0.347)	-0.654 (0.345)	-1.107** (0.356)	-0.864* (0.361)	-0.828* (0.340)	-0.745* (0.338)
Debt crisis	-0.223 (0.539)	-0.321 (0.539)	-0.151 (0.497)	-0.299 (0.539)	-0.365 (0.540)	-0.148 (0.535)	-0.342 (0.542)	-0.378 (0.519)	-0.358 (0.538)	-0.466 (0.520)	-0.244 (0.534)	-0.204 (0.534)	-0.392 (0.543)	-0.508 (0.520)	-0.481 (0.520)
Freedom from killing	0.664 (0.345)	0.578 (0.348)		0.597 (0.344)	0.541 (0.347)	0.675* (0.340)	0.558 (0.347)		0.528 (0.340)			0.567 (0.335)	0.624 (0.340)	0.518 (0.345)	
Support group size	0.621 (0.330)	0.432 (0.343)		0.613 (0.327)	0.436 (0.341)		0.437 (0.342)	0.631* (0.317)	0.592 (0.323)	0.638* (0.315)	0.548 (0.329)		0.442 (0.340)	0.658* (0.315)	
Pro-autocracy mobilization	-0.993** (0.334)	-0.901** (0.337)		-0.763* (0.383)	-0.739 (0.386)	-0.919** (0.326)	-0.897** (0.339)	-0.928** (0.324)		-0.666 (0.370)		-0.739* (0.372)	-0.736 (0.386)		
Opposition autonomy	-0.237 (0.397)	-0.444 (0.411)		-0.189 (0.393)	-0.396 (0.409)	0.005 (0.372)	-0.412 (0.411)	-0.015 (0.360)	-0.055 (0.366)	0.024 (0.360)	-0.055 (0.358)	0.058 (0.371)	-0.357 (0.409)	0.075 (0.345)	-0.164 (0.365)
Regime duration	-0.295 (0.273)	-0.383 (0.280)		-0.320 (0.278)	-0.399 (0.283)	-0.380 (0.268)	-0.369 (0.280)	-0.203 (0.264)	-0.248 (0.273)	-0.234 (0.271)	-0.222 (0.263)	-0.406 (0.272)	-0.382 (0.283)	-0.191 (0.268)	-0.365 (0.263)
State ownership of economy	0.738* (0.352)	0.771* (0.354)		0.851* (0.370)	0.848* (0.370)	0.492 (0.357)	0.728* (0.368)	0.761* (0.339)	0.821* (0.369)	0.908* (0.357)	0.585 (0.344)	0.603 (0.371)	0.799* (0.383)	0.901* (0.357)	0.498 (0.345)
Judicial constraints	0.498 (1.583)	-1.173 (1.760)		-0.076 (1.647)	-1.495 (1.798)	0.441 (1.588)	-1.348 (2.027)	2.331 (1.605)	-0.355 (1.643)	1.606 (1.662)	0.666 (1.552)	-0.058 (1.650)	-1.723 (2.064)	1.503 (1.664)	0.105 (1.704)
Co-optation*crisis	-0.306 (0.400)	-0.281 (0.400)	-0.531 (0.390)	-0.295 (0.402)	-0.281 (0.401)	-0.318 (0.404)	-0.258 (0.400)	-0.312 (0.392)	-0.369 (0.398)	-0.291 (0.396)	-0.430 (0.396)	-0.314 (0.404)	-0.254 (0.401)	-0.376 (0.392)	-0.360 (0.398)
Polyarchy		4.320 (2.453)			4.060 (2.469)		3.795 (2.841)						3.427 (2.852)		6.933** (2.420)
Polarization				-0.364 (0.340)	-0.258 (0.339)				-0.598 (0.322)	-0.453 (0.326)		-0.301 (0.327)	-0.261 (0.337)	-0.614* (0.309)	
Opposition group size						0.138 (0.327)						0.096 (0.327)			0.338 (0.316)
Legislative constraints							0.426 (1.879)						0.526 (1.880)		
Freedom from torture								-0.368 (0.361)		-0.407 (0.364)				-0.432 (0.366)	-0.506 (0.364)
Pro-democracy mobilization									-0.157 (0.203)		-0.326 (0.186)			-0.202 (0.201)	-0.247 (0.184)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	438.053	438.701	439.229	439.654	440.664	441.158	441.317	441.586	442.306	442.342	442.716	442.816	443.288	443.998	444.631
BIC	921.222	927.489	883.070	928.442	935.071	924.328	934.679	924.755	931.094	931.130	925.886	931.604	942.256	932.786	933.419
Log Likelihood	-133.026	-132.350	-140.614	-132.827	-132.332	-134.579	-132.658	-134.793	-134.153	-134.171	-135.358	-134.408	-132.644	-134.999	-135.315
Deviance	266.053	264.701	281.229	265.654	264.664	269.158	265.317	269.586	268.306	268.342	270.716	268.816	265.288	269.998	270.631
Num. obs.	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2011	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035	2011	2035	2035

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

*Table C14: GLM PL-FE regressions of business support
with executive bribery as co-optation. Interactions with debt crisis.*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
(Intercept)	-1.980 (1.865)	-2.306 (1.853)	-2.741 (1.819)	-2.897 (1.821)	-1.608 (1.808)	-2.156 (1.753)	-1.865 (1.745)	-1.741 (1.763)	-1.993 (1.770)	-1.568 (1.780)	-1.917 (1.766)	-1.767 (1.791)	-1.677 (1.760)	-1.555 (1.785)	-2.530 (1.753)
Co-optation	1.297*** (0.279)	1.290*** (0.274)	1.341*** (0.283)	1.309*** (0.277)	1.101*** (0.262)	1.187*** (0.272)	1.215*** (0.270)	1.214*** (0.271)	1.194*** (0.273)	1.104*** (0.258)	1.184*** (0.277)	1.187*** (0.277)	1.210*** (0.275)	1.208*** (0.275)	1.074*** (0.263)
Debt crisis	0.522 (0.401)	0.514 (0.397)	0.450 (0.387)	0.445 (0.380)	0.563 (0.402)	0.429 (0.378)	0.395 (0.377)	0.395 (0.379)	0.425 (0.380)	0.528 (0.399)	0.511 (0.381)	0.505 (0.383)	0.481 (0.380)	0.482 (0.382)	0.561 (0.386)
Freedom from killing	-0.417 (0.238)		-0.485* (0.240)		-0.293 (0.230)	-0.363 (0.230)	-0.393 (0.230)	-0.390 (0.232)	-0.359 (0.231)						-0.352 (0.232)
Support group size	-0.292 (0.231)		-0.202 (0.229)		-0.252 (0.228)			-0.029 (0.216)	-0.018 (0.217)			-0.037 (0.220)		-0.044 (0.219)	-0.088 (0.223)
Pro-autocracy mobilization	-0.235 (0.280)		-0.166 (0.270)		-0.624** (0.240)	-0.346 (0.269)			-0.309 (0.265)		-0.337 (0.268)	-0.306 (0.264)			-0.581* (0.233)
Opposition autonomy	-0.461 (0.286)	-0.625* (0.291)	-0.430 (0.287)	-0.598* (0.293)	-0.450 (0.283)	-0.191 (0.268)	-0.178 (0.266)	-0.155 (0.265)	-0.159 (0.267)	-0.562* (0.286)	-0.237 (0.269)	-0.205 (0.268)	-0.231 (0.267)	-0.208 (0.267)	-0.395 (0.282)
Regime duration	0.483* (0.212)	0.471* (0.213)	0.471* (0.210)	0.444* (0.211)	0.403* (0.201)	0.553** (0.209)	0.588** (0.210)	0.593** (0.211)	0.567** (0.209)	0.401* (0.202)	0.532* (0.208)	0.544** (0.208)	0.561** (0.209)	0.564** (0.209)	0.373 (0.198)
State ownership of economy	1.370*** (0.337)	1.090*** (0.315)	1.297*** (0.313)	1.029*** (0.298)	1.285*** (0.328)	1.308*** (0.313)	1.328*** (0.314)	1.367*** (0.312)	1.355*** (0.312)	1.074*** (0.309)	1.175*** (0.299)	1.225*** (0.296)	1.172*** (0.297)	1.210*** (0.293)	1.191*** (0.304)
Judicial constraints	-0.509 (1.508)	-0.570 (1.510)	-0.962 (1.420)	-1.042 (1.436)	0.125 (1.475)	0.612 (1.302)	0.758 (1.293)	0.636 (1.285)	0.426 (1.300)	0.522 (1.472)	-0.205 (1.374)	-0.265 (1.383)	-0.036 (1.360)	-0.088 (1.365)	-0.385 (1.388)
Polyarchy	5.513** (1.948)	5.543** (1.941)	5.116** (1.794)	5.281** (1.795)	4.819* (1.904)					4.961** (1.893)					4.039* (1.738)
Legislative constraints	-1.311 (1.387)	-1.257 (1.383)			-1.663 (1.340)					-1.737 (1.333)					
Polarization	-0.843** (0.287)	-0.873*** (0.260)	-0.981*** (0.275)	-0.959*** (0.256)		-0.839** (0.268)	-0.901*** (0.256)	-0.887*** (0.254)	-0.834** (0.268)		-0.780** (0.261)	-0.778** (0.261)	-0.847*** (0.249)	-0.837*** (0.247)	
Co-optation*crisis	-0.416 (0.292)	-0.354 (0.293)	-0.462 (0.287)	-0.394 (0.287)	-0.411 (0.292)	-0.478 (0.279)	-0.465 (0.280)	-0.452 (0.281)	-0.456 (0.281)	-0.349 (0.294)	-0.471 (0.283)	-0.452 (0.285)	-0.458 (0.284)	-0.449 (0.286)	-0.520 (0.286)
Freedom from torture		-0.280 (0.259)		-0.337 (0.258)						-0.227 (0.258)	-0.034 (0.243)	-0.054 (0.246)	-0.059 (0.241)	-0.066 (0.245)	
Opposition group size		0.233 (0.219)		0.216 (0.219)		0.146 (0.215)	0.096 (0.209)			0.120 (0.207)	0.133 (0.217)		0.085 (0.212)		
Pro-democracy mobilization		-0.049 (0.163)		-0.069 (0.162)			-0.183 (0.160)	-0.183 (0.160)		-0.219 (0.151)			-0.149 (0.160)	-0.152 (0.160)	
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	693.012	695.982	696.436	698.546	698.878	702.261	702.458	702.587	702.622	704.196	704.625	704.848	705.192	705.229	706.280
BIC	1191.980	1194.951	1190.843	1192.952	1192.240	1191.049	1191.245	1191.375	1191.410	1197.558	1193.412	1193.636	1193.980	1194.016	1195.068
Log Likelihood	-257.506	-258.991	-260.218	-261.273	-261.439	-264.130	-264.229	-264.294	-264.311	-264.098	-265.312	-265.424	-265.596	-265.614	-266.140
Deviance	515.012	517.982	520.436	522.546	522.878	528.261	528.458	528.587	528.622	528.196	530.625	530.848	531.192	531.229	532.280
Num. obs.	2011	2011	2035	2035	2011	2035	2035	2035	2035	2011	2035	2035	2035	2035	2035

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table C15: Main regressions with an alternative measure of institutional co-optation.

	Opposition				Support			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
(Intercept)	-3.66 (2.11)	-5.55* (2.18)	-7.35** (2.28)	-8.33*** (2.34)	-0.86 (1.85)	-2.12 (1.99)	-1.25 (1.85)	-2.02 (1.99)
Co-optation	-1.14*** (0.32)	-1.01** (0.31)	-1.02** (0.33)	-0.97** (0.33)	1.08*** (0.25)	1.16*** (0.25)	1.07*** (0.25)	1.11*** (0.25)
Debt crisis	-0.81* (0.41)	-0.92* (0.41)	-0.59 (0.43)	-0.69 (0.43)	0.11 (0.30)	0.24 (0.31)	0.06 (0.30)	0.20 (0.32)
Access to state jobs	0.12 (0.69)	-0.29 (0.67)	-0.28 (0.71)	-0.71 (0.70)	0.45 (0.42)	0.06 (0.46)	0.39 (0.41)	-0.14 (0.44)
Freedom from torture	-0.38 (0.37)	-0.58 (0.38)			-0.20 (0.25)	-0.34 (0.26)		
State ownership	0.71* (0.36)	0.47 (0.36)	0.81* (0.37)	0.70 (0.38)	1.20*** (0.30)	1.11*** (0.32)	1.35*** (0.31)	1.38*** (0.34)
Pro-democracy mobilization	-0.22 (0.20)	-0.23 (0.20)			-0.16 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.16)		
Polarization	-0.54 (0.30)	-0.35 (0.29)	-0.38 (0.34)	-0.28 (0.34)	-0.83*** (0.25)	-0.87*** (0.26)	-0.84** (0.27)	-0.83** (0.29)
Judicial constraints	1.28 (1.67)	-1.00 (1.98)	0.07 (1.77)	-1.43 (2.09)	-0.41 (1.38)	-0.70 (1.51)	-0.30 (1.33)	-0.71 (1.51)
Opposition Autonomy	0.24 (0.35)	-0.01 (0.37)	-0.15 (0.39)	-0.30 (0.41)	-0.20 (0.26)	-0.57* (0.29)	-0.12 (0.26)	-0.39 (0.28)
Opposition group size	0.06 (0.31)	0.27 (0.32)			0.03 (0.21)	0.20 (0.22)		
Regime duration	-0.36 (0.26)	-0.37 (0.26)	-0.35 (0.28)	-0.41 (0.28)	0.52* (0.21)	0.44* (0.21)	0.52* (0.21)	0.45* (0.21)
Legislative constraints		1.80 (1.77)		0.92 (1.85)		-1.33 (1.38)		-1.41 (1.38)
Polyarchy		4.82 (2.68)		3.44 (2.81)		5.72** (1.97)		5.73** (2.01)
Freedom from killing			0.64 (0.35)	0.58 (0.35)			-0.38 (0.23)	-0.41 (0.24)
Pro-autocracy mobilization			-0.77* (0.38)	-0.74 (0.38)			-0.30 (0.27)	-0.25 (0.28)
Support group size			0.59 (0.33)	0.38 (0.34)			0.02 (0.21)	-0.27 (0.23)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	447.79	448.54	439.88	443.18	706.11	697.06	704.00	694.75
BIC	936.58	947.50	928.67	942.15	1194.90	1196.03	1192.79	1193.72
Log Likelihood	-136.89	-135.27	-132.94	-132.59	-266.06	-259.53	-265.00	-258.38
Deviance	273.79	270.54	265.88	265.18	532.11	519.06	530.00	516.75
Num. obs.	2035	2011	2035	2011	2035	2011	2035	2011

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$




Figure C1: Posterior predictive checks for the Bayesian causal mediation analysis.